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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: DEATH OR INJUIRY
FROM AIR MISHAP.
By WmLum Q. Dv FuNmAx*
It may be remarked at the outset that the cases involving
workmen's compensation for death or injury resulting from an
air mishap can be subjected to various classifications. For
example, the cases may be classified according to whether the
employee is a pilot or mechanic whose employment consists in
actually flying or operating an airplane, going aloft in one in
the course of his professional duties, or "servicing" it on the
ground, or according to whether he is one whose duties have no
connection with operating or repairing airplanes but who is
required to ride in them as a passenger, occasionally or
regularly, in. the course of his employment.
In the first situation, of course, the question of whether the
death or injury occurred in the course of employment may
possibly be of easier determination than in the latter situation.
However, as the same statutory provisions and legal principles
appear to govern equally in both situations, the writer has made
no attempt to treat the cases under such classifications.
Likewise, it is to be noted that some cases are proceedings
before compensation boards or industrial commissions, or
appeals therefrom, while other cases involve actions against the
employer or insurer. But here, too, the questions and principles
involved are usually identical, requiring no separation of the
cases for purposes of treatment.
APPLICABILITY OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS.

Naturally, at the time of the enactment of many state compensation acts, aviation and air transportation were not
developed to the point at which they are today, and the question
may arise as to whether death or injury resulting from an air
mishap is within the terms of such act.' Generally, however, it
seems that these matters are now included within the provisions
'See Ft. Smith Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 151
Okla. 67, 1 P. (2d) 682 (1931).
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of most acts, 2 although the situation has arisen where the effect
of an amendment of the act was to remove from its provisions
pilots and instructors formerly included. 3
It has been said that as to aircraft operating in intrastate
commerce, where it does not appear that Congress or the
Department of Commerce has adopted any rule as to compensation of injured employees, or as to the relative rights and obligations of employers and employees, in case of injury to the latter
while engaged in their employment, the states may act in regard
thereto within their respective jurisdictions. In consequence,
a state workmen's compensation act has been held applicable to
employers and employees engaged merely in intrastate aircraft
navigation, where they were otherwise subject to its provisions.4
There seems to be no reason why the same should not be
true as to aircraft operating in interstate commerce, as to the
application of state compensation acts, subject of course to such
difficulties as are inherent in applying the doctrines of conflict of
laws. 5 An Illinois court has held the employer and employee
bound by the Illinois act and allowed recovery of compensation
thereunder where the employee, while flying in the employer's
plane as a passenger, at its direction, was injured while flying
over the state of Missouri.6 And where an air route between
Minnesota and Illinois was operated by a corporation of
Minnesota, in which state the business offices were maintained,
the pay rolls distributed, the pilots lived and received all their
instruction, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that a pilot injured in a crash was subject to the Minnesota
Workmen's Compensation Act so as to preclude a common law
negligence action, notwithstanding that the crash occurred in
Wisconsin and regardless of the fact that the contract of
' See generally the cases infra.
'State ex rel. Northwest Airlines v. Hoover, 200 Wash. 277, 93

P. (2d) 346 (1939).
"Sheboygan Airways v. Industrial Commission, 209 Wis. 352,
245 N.W.178 (1932).
'See Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws,
(1935) 20 Minn. Law Rev. 19.
'Schnell v. National Air Transport, 16 N.E. (2d) 191 (Il1. App.

1938).
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employment was made in Iowa, on the theory that the employer's
7
business was "localized" in Minnesota.
The situation has been presented of a compensation act
providing that it "shall not apply to workmen outside of the
state". A garage mechanic was employed in New Hampshire
and his employer seems regularly to have loaned his services to
an air line company. The employee, during one of these
periods, was injured while working for the air line company
in Maine. The company had accepted the provisions of the New
Hampshire act. The New Hampshire court declared that the
words quoted did not refer specifically to the place where an
accident occurred but were used to designate a particular class
of workmen, that is, worlken who, although in the employ of
one accepting the provisions of the local act were nevertheless
regularly employed in work in another state. It was said not to
be intended to apply to the case of a workman whose employment at times required him to cross the state boundary.S
Whether an employee is covered by a compensation policy
carried by the employer has been said to be determined by the
statute of the state, the terms of the policy, and the general
nature of his employment, and not at all by the question of
whether the particular thing he was doing at the time of his
injury was hazardous and if customarily engaged in would
have been subject to a higher premium rate.9
'Severson v. Hanford Tri-State Airlines, 105 F. (2d) 622 (1939),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 696 (mem.). Aerial photographer hired in
New York by employer having its principal place of business in
New York and killed in plane crash in California was held subject
to New York act because his employment was located in New York.
Alexander v. Movietones, Inc., 273 N.Y. 511, 6 N.E. (2d) 604 (1937).
Employee living and working in Washington was subject to act
of that state, though employer was non-resident and contract of
employment was made in state of latter's residence. Livermore v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., (Wash. Super. Ct.) 1939 U.S. Av. Rep. 155.
8Bisson v. Winnipesaukee Air Service, (N.H.) 13 A. 2d 821
(1940).
'Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Shytles, 47 F. (2d) 441 (1931).
Whether compensation policy intended to cover particular
employee, see Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 84 P. (2d) 793 (Cal. App. 1938).
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Wno Is AN EmPLOYEE OR WORKMAN

Who is an employee or workman within the terms of a
workmen's compensation act is usually defined by the act.1 0
It may be additionally necessary, however, to apply the common
law rules for determining the relationship of master and
servant."
Under such rules, the final test and all important
factor is the right of control, since the question of control
determines whether the relationship is that of independent
12
contractor or that of employer and employee.
Accordingly, where the owner of an airplane directs when
and where the pilot shall take it, or instructs the pilot to go where
directed by a passenger whom he is employed by the owner of
the plane to pilot, the owner paying the pilot's salary and having
the sole right to discharge him, the relationship of employer and
employee is established.1 3 Similarly, where a pilot entered
into an arrangement with the owner of a plane, who was engaged
in the business of taking passengers for sight-seeing flights and
in instructing student flyers, whereby the pilot was to take up
sight-seers and instruct student flyers in return for forty per
eent of the gross receipts, the owner to receive the remainder
and to bear all expenses of keeping up the plane, the pilot was a
workman within the compensation act. The fact that during
the flight the pilot was in custody of and actually operating the
plane did not make him a bailee. 14
Even where the purchaser of a plane engaged a pilot to
e411 for the plane at the factory and fiy it to the purchaser in
California, and the purchaser had no control over the time the
flight was to begin or end, the route to be taken, the speed to be
"See Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Shytles (Texas act), supra
N. 9; Hinds v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 150 Wash. 230, 272
Pac. 734, 62 A.L.R. 225 (1928). Even though the compensation act
may create a presumption of employment, such presumption may be
overcome by conflicting evidence as to whether a pilot was an
employee within the act. Gale v. Industrial Accident Commission,
211 Cal. 137, 294 Pac. 391 (1930).
U See Hinds v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, supra, n. 10.
"Meyer v. Industrial Commission, 347 Ill. 172, 179 N.E. 456
(1932); Schonberg v. Zinsmaster, 173 Minn. 414, 217 N.W. 491
(1928); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Kelly, 56 S.W. (2d) 1108
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boggs, 66 S.W. (2d)
787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Hinds v. Dept. of Labor and Industries,
supra n. 10.
"Meyer v. Industrial Commission, supra n. 12; Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Boggs, supra n. 12.
" Hinds v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, supra n. 10.
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used, etc., the pilot occupied the position of an employee within
the compensation act and not that of an independent contractor.
It may be noticed as an additional element of the case that the
pilot, without notice to the purchaser, accepted and flew from
the factory another plane, the one purchased not having been
completed. 15
Where a bakery salesman, not himself a licensed pilot,
owned a plane which he furnished, together with a licensed
pilot, and agreed to use the plane in the business of the company, subject to the company's directions, in return for a
weekly salary, an expense account, and the cancellation of his
note held by the company, the baking company exercised such
control over his acts as to create the relationship of master and
servant. 16
WHO IS AN EMPLOYER.

As in the case of an employee or workman, who is an
employer within the terms of a compensation act is usually
defined by the act.' 7 And in certain respects whether an
employer, such as an aviation company for example, is within
the terms of the act is governed by rules applicable to any
8
employer.'
Necessarily, the determination in a particular case that the
injured person is an employee ordinarily is decisive on the point
of who is an employer. However, the question of general
employer and special employer has sometimes arisen. Thus,
where the owner of a plane employing a pilot therefor rented the
plane and the services of the pilot to a motion picture company
for a day, the pilot to be subject to the orders of the motion
15Murray v. Industrial Accident Commission, 216 Cal. 340, 14 P.
(2d) 301 (1932).

Schonberg v. Zinsmaster Baking Co., supra, n. 12.

Knipe v. Skelgas Co., 294 N.W. 880 (Iowa 1940).

See also

'A usual condition is the employment of a certain number of
employees. See Sheboygan Airways v. Industrial Commission,
supra n. 4
Sheboygan Airways v. Industrial Commission, supra n. 4. And
see Soule v. McHenry, 286 Pa. 49, 132 Atl. 799 (1926).
Airplane owner filing with Industrial Commission certificate of
election to be bound by act, and procuring compensation policy
naming pilot as employee complied with requirements of act as to
making election to be bound thereby and was "employer" within
definition of term in act. Meyer v. Industrial Commission, supra
n. 12.
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picture company, and the pilot was injured during the day, he
was entitled to look to both for compensation. The pilot being
under the control and direction of the motion picture company
and having been injured in the course of following such direction, could hold it liable as a special employer, the owner of the
plane being the pilot's general employer. 19 In another case of
similar nature, although the terms general and special employer
were not used, an air line company which regularly availed itself
of the loan of a garage mechanic's services was liable under the
compensation act when he was injured while engaged in work
for it. He was, in other words, the employee of the air line company, although the company did not pay him directly for his
services but paid to his regular employer the wages he earned
from the air line company.20
On the other hand, where a mechanic, working off his
employer's premises, was repairing the airplane of another than
his employer and was injured while cranking the airplane
engine, it was held that he remained under the control of his
regular employer, being paid by the latter and his work being
supervised by the latter's manager. 2 1
AvIyTON oi FLYNG HAZARDOUS EMPLOYMENT
This point has been raised with regard to the Oklahoma
Workmen's Compensation Act. 22 The employer was a corporation formed for the purposes of building, manufacturing, selling
and repairing airplanes, engaging in the transportation business, and in instructing persons to fly and operate airplanes.
The employee was engaged as a flying instructor, to carry passengers from one place to another, and to work in the shop, if
necessary, to aid the mechanic. He was seriously injured in an
airplane crash while going up with a student flyer.
The employer contended that the pilot was not engaged in
a hazardous employment covered by the act. The act provided,
in part, "Compensation provided for in this act shall be payable
for injuries sustained by employees engaged in the following
I Famous Players-Lasky Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 194 Cal. 134, 228 Pac. 5, 34 A..R. 765 (1924).
Bisson v. Winnipesaukee Air Service, supra n. 8.
SSee Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Arnold 1 S.W. (2d) 434
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
Ft. Smith Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Commission, supra
n. 1.
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hazardous employments, to wit: Factories . . . and work
shops where machinery is used." It then defined "factory" and
"workshop".
It was argued by the employer that the employee was not
employed in a factory or workshop. The court held, however,
that the employer's airport in which a shop was maintained for
repairing and cleaning airplanes was a factory, and being a
place where power driven machinery was employed for profit
was also a workshop, and that the employee sustained his injury
while handling power driven machinery and while engaged in
manual and mechanical labor by way of trade or gain. As to
the point that the employee was not injured while working in the
shop or within the limits of the airport, but while flying an airplane some distance therefrom, the court said: "The rule is
well established that an injury is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act when it is sustained in performing an
act which is fairly incidental to the prosecution of the master's
business, even though such acts may not be performed at the
building or premises where the major part of the work of the
employee is done."
This decision is, obviously, a very strained construction of
the act to make it include employees of aviation companies as
among those engaged in hazardous occupations. In comparison
with the foregoing case may be considered one construing the
Washington Workmen's Compensation Act. 2 3 It appears from
this latter case that a reclassification made by an amendment
of the Washington act resulted in dropping airplane pilots and
instructors from the list of those engaged in extrahazardous
occupations, although "airplane (manufacturing)" was added.
The court refused to consider pilots as any longer within the
provisions of the act as engaged in extrahazardous occupations,
and refused to construe "motor delivery", listed among the
extrahazardous occupations, as including employees driving
planes.
Attention has already been called to the holding that
whether a pilot was covered by a compensation policy was not
determinable by whether the particular thing he was doing at the
time of his injury was more or less hazardous, but by the
' State ex rel. Northwest Airlines v. Hoover, supra n. 3.
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statutes of the state, the terms of the policy, and the general
24
nature of his employment.
Another aspect of flying as hazardous is presented by the
question whether the use by an employee of airplane transportation to further his employer's business is a hazard not contemplated by the contract of employment. In an Iowa case it has
been held not to be one so as to deprive an injured employee of
his right to compensation. 25
As

SUSTAINED IN

THE COURSE OP EMPLOYMENT

Compensation can only be awarded where, at the time of
the injury or death, the employee is performing service growing
out of and incidental to his employment.25 Using the employer's
plane to give a free ride to friends of the employee for their
enjoyment, without in any way furthering the employer's
interests or for the employee's own personal gain, is not acting
27
within the scope of employment.
Similarly, voluntarily doing stunt or acrobatic flying which
subjects the employer's property to great and needless peril is
clearly outside the scope of employment.28 In addition, stunt or
acrobatic flying may be in violation of a rule of a state aeronautics commission, constituting a misdemeanor removing the
pilot from the benefits of the workmen's compensation act.2 9
The effect of the pilot's violation of the law may also be seen in
the holding that an employee, operating his own plane without
a license for it or a pilot's license for himself, in violation of
penal statutes of the state, and who was killed while on his
employer's business, did not meet his death in the course of his
See Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Shytles, supra n. 9.
Knipe v. Skelgas Co., supra n. 16
"Indrebo v. Industrial Commission, 209 Wis. 272, 243 N.W. 464
(1932).
" Sheboygan Airways v. Industrial Commission, supra n. 4.
T

Stites v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 2 Cal. Ind. Acc. Comm.

635 (1915); Sheboygan Airways v. Industrial Commission, supra
n. 4. In the Stites Case, it appeared, however, that an aviator
employed by a motion picture company and killed while operating
an airplane for the purpose of taking motion pictures, was not
engaged in stunt flying but in straightaway flying, and it was a
vacuum created in the air by the explosion of a bomb below his

plane that caused his precipitation to the ground and his resulting

injuries, and the full death benefit allowed by the statute was
awarded to his widow.
,Datin v. Vale, (Pa. Dept. of Labor & Industry) 1931 U.S. Av.
Rep. 175.
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employment within the meaning of the state compensation act.30
Disregard of some of the employer's instructions does not
necessarily place the employee without the scope of his employment. Thus, where a pilot, part of whose duties was to give
lessons to student flyers, was killed while giving such lessons,
he was held to have been acting in the course of his employment,
although disregarding his employer's instructions to return the
plane. 31
Since it is to the interest of an employer that a plane owned
and used by the employer's salesman be kept in a serviceable
condition, 32 injury to or death of the salesman while on a test
flight is considered as occurring within the scope of employ33
ment.
With relation to employees who are not pilots and whose
duties do not ordinarily require their riding in airplanes, it has
been held that a theatre manager who was killed in an airplane
accident while flying to an authorized mission to advertise his
theatre was killed in the furtherance of his employer's business,
within the meaning of the compensation act, and was not
excluded from compensation under a compensation policy on the
ground that he was not in the usual course of his employer's
business. 34 Likewise, injuries received by a salesman while
traveling in an airplane on his employer's business have been
held compensable under the act although the contract of employment did not expressly mention the use of airplanes as a means
of transportation. The court remarked that the contract did not
limit the mode of transportation to be used and that air travel is
today a recognized and commonplace means of transportation. 35
And deaths of a motion picture camera man and a director were
held compensable where they were flying in the camera man's
plane to inspect a set for a new picture, which it was their duty
"°Bugh v. Employers Reinsurance Co., 63 F. (2d) 36 (1933),
(violation of Texas statutes).
"Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boggs, supra n. 12.
'2Schonberg v. Zinsmaster, supra n. 12.
' Hammer v. General Electric X-Ray Corp., (Minn. Ind. Comm.)
1932 U.S. Av. Rep. 242; Schonberg v. Zinsmaster, supra n. 12. See
also Shults v. Colonial Flying Service, 262 N.Y. 667, 188 N.E.
113 (1933).
" Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Shytles, supra, n. 9.
Knipe v. Skelgas Co., supra n. 16.
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to inspect before beginning the taking of the picture. 36 In some
of the foregoing cases the point was made by the court that the
exercise of initiative and discretion was required of the employee
in the performance of his duties and that the use of an airplane
was warranted in the exercise of such initiative and discretion.3 7
On the other hand, one employed as a salesman and garage
mechanic, who was told by his employer that he could take the
employer's place as passenger in an airplane from which advertising circulars were to be dropped, the employer having no
interest in the plane or its earnings or in th.e receipts from the
advertising, was not acting within the course of his employment
when killed by the airplane crashing. 38
The chief inspector of an airplane factory whose duty it
was to check inspection cards, etc., after the test flight of a
plane, and who entered a plane and was killed on its trip from
the factory to a storage hangar was said to have been killed in
the course of his employment. 3 9 And a mechanic employed by
an auto repair company, injured and killed while cranking an
airplane owned by another company but habitually repaired by
his company, was acting in the course of his employment. 40
In conclusion it may be remarked that where the proceedings are before a state industrial commission, the question
whether the employee was acting in the course of his employment is one of fact for the commission, 41 and upon appeal its
findings of fact thereon are considered conclusive, and are not
"Stumar v. Industrial Accident Commission, 16 Cal. App. (2d)
429, 60 P. (2d) 557 (1936); Wiley v. Same, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 756,
60 P. (2d) 558 (1936).

"See cases, supra notes 35, 36.
'Indrebo

v. Industrial Commission, supra n. 26.

See also

Fulwiler v. Mack Internat. Motor Truck Corp., (Pa. Com. P. Ct.),
1939 U.S. Av. Rep. 192, where motor truck salesman killed while on
pleasure trip with prospective customer was held not acting within

course of his employment.
" Crutcher v. Curtiss-Robertson Airplane Mfg. Co., 331 Mo. 169,
52 S.W. (2d) 1019 (1932). See also Smith v. Industrial Commission,
21 Ab. (Ohio) 282, 1937 U.S. Av. Rep. 129.
'Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Arnold, supra n. 21. See also
Bisson v. Winnipesaukee Air Service, supra n. 8.

"1Ft. Smith Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Commission, supra

n. 1; also Murray v. Industrial Accident Commission, supra n. 15;
Bisson v. Winnipesaukee Air Service, supra n. 8.
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disturbed unless entirely without support in the evidence. 42
Where the question is material, and the commission has failed
to make findings thereon, the record must be sent back to the
43
commission for such findings.

' Indrebo v. Industrial Commission, supra n. 26; also Ft. Smith
Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Commission, supra n. 1; Murray v.
Industrial Accident Commission, supra n. 15.
' Sheboygan Airways v. Industrial Commission, supra n. 4.

